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SUMMARY
There are today approximately 2000 hydroelectric projects
operating under licenses from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC). Because many of these licenses were issued
for 50-year terms beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, they are or
soon will be eligible for relicensing. As FERC confronts
hundreds of relicensing proceedings between now and the end of
the century, it must reevaluate the wisdom of each project based
upon today's more sophisticated legal and environmental
standards. This task is made difficult because the projects
often were subjected to little or no environmental scrutiny in
their initial licensing.
FERC has a statutory obligation to license only those
hydroelectric projects that are best adapted to a comprehensive
plan for resource development. To achieve this goal, FERC is
directed to consult with other federal and state government
agencies.
FERC's ability to achieve the goal is complicated by
the existence of state water laws which the Federal Power Act has
directed FERC to respect.
The degree of respect which FERC must accord to state water
laws has been a matter of dispute for almost fifty years. At one
extreme are the states which insist that FERC cannot interfere
with any state water laws, whether they be water rights laws or
regulatory laws governing the use of those water rights. FERC,
at the other extreme, insists that it need only adhere to those
state water laws which are consistent with the regulatory scheme
set forth in the Federal Power Act, and may ignore all others.
The better view is that the Federal Power Act establishes a
system of concurrent state and federal control in which FERC
licensees must comply with state laws unless FERC affirmatively
determines that to do so would conflict with the purposes of the
Federal Power Act.
The interaction between federal and state regulation under
the Federal Power Act was the principal issue in a opinion
announced by the Supreme Court several weeks ago. The Court's
resolution of the issue — largely if not entirely in FERC's
favor — still leaves open a number of questions about FERC's
authority to control over water allocation decisions.
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OUTLINE
I.

HISTORY
A.

Congress has the authority to protect the navigable
waters of the United States under the commerce clause
of the Constitution (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 3, cl. 2).
1.

Since Congress has the authority to exclude all
structures from navigable waters of the United
States, it can condition permission to build such
structures upon grant of a license.

2.

To a large extent, congressional authority to
control navigable waters has been subsumed under
it broader commerce clause powers (Oklahoma ex
rel. Phillips v. Guv F. Atchison Co.. 313 U.S. 508
(1941)).

B.

Congress also has the authority under the supremacy
clause to occupy the entire field of regulation of
hydroelectric power and thereby supercede any
conflicting state laws on the subject (U.S. Const. Art.
IV, § 2) .

C.

Notwithstanding clear constitutional authority to do
so, Congress and the Supreme Court both have been
reluctant to assert congressional supreme authority to
regulate all matters relating to navigable waters of
the United States, including especially matters
relating to proprietary water rights which form the
backbone of the economy in the western United States
2

(See United States v. New Mexico. 438 U.S. 696, 702
n.5 (1978)

(citing reference to 37 statutes which

indicate congressional deference to state water laws);
California v. United States. 438 U.S. 645 (1978)
(holding that the federal government must comply with
state water law in obtaining water for federal
reclamation projects)).
1.

The federal policy of deference to state water law
originated in the egual footing doctrine which
holds that the states have sovereign right, title,
and interest to all navigable waters within their
boundaries subject to the congressional power to
regulate commerce and navigation (see Oregon v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.. 429 U.S. 363 (1977);
S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1951)

(quoted in California v. United States. 438 U.S.
645 (1978)).
2.

Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, for
example, defers to state water rights law (43
U.S.C.§§ 372, 383.

3.

The 1944 Flood Control Act contains the policy
statement that it is declared to be the policy of
the Congress "to recognize the interests and
rights of the States ... in water utilization and
control."

4.

The Supreme Court has held that each state is
3

entitled to establish its own system of water
rights subject to two limitations: federal
reserved water rights, and the federal navigation
servitude (California v. United States. 438 U.S.
645 (1978)

(citing United States v. Rio Grande Dam

and Irrigation Co.. 174 U.S. 690 (1899))).
D.

The Federal Power Act was enacted to promote the
private development of hydroelectric power in the
United States (Federal Water Power Act of 1920, ch.
825, 41 Stat. 1063; Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49
Stat. 863, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828).

E.

The Federal Power Act was premised on the principle
that the electric power potential of the nation's
navigable waterways is a public resource which should
be harnessed in a manner consistent with the public
interest.
1.

The Federal Power Act granted comprehensive
authority to the Federal Power Commission (now the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or FERC) to
administer and regulate all hydroelectric
development occurring on navigable waters in the
United States (see California v. FERC. ___ U.S. __
1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).

2.

The Federal Power Act requires that FERC consider
all beneficial public uses of water in deciding
whether and under what terms and conditions to
4

issue a hydroelectric project license (Federal
Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C.§ 803(a)).
3.

The Federal Power Commission is made the "guardian
of the public domain" with regard to water within
navigable streams (Federal Power Comm'n v. Idaho
Power Co.. 344 U.S. 17 (1952)).

4.

FERC must impose conditions on every license for a
hydroelectric project to require its adaption to a
comprehensive plan for multiple use of federally
regulated waterways (Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16
U.S.C. § 803(a)).

F.

Since enactment of the Federal Power Act, there has
been a great expansion in the federal commerce clause
authority and a concomitant expansion in breadth of
federal regulation under the Federal Power Act.
(United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.. 311 U.S.
377 (1940); see generally Note, Small Hydropower
Projects and State Water Rights, 18 Pac. L. J. 1225
(1987) ) .
1.

Federal power over navigable waters is plenary.

2.

States and private parties retain authority to
control or hold rights in such waters only subject
to "the power of Congress to control the waters
for the purpose of commerce." (United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co.. 311 U.S. 377 (1940)
(quoting United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation
5

Co.. 174 U.S. 690 (1899))).
II.

RECOGNITION OF ROLE OF STATE LAW IN REGULATION OF
HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
A.

The Federal Power Act recognizes that federal
regulation of hydroelectric power may conflict with
state regulation of water rights, an area of
traditional state authority in which the federal
government has been reluctant to intrude.
1.

Section 9 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 802, requires an applicant for a license under
the Federal Power Act to submit "satisfactory"
evidence that it has complied with the
requirements of state law of the state within
which the project is to be located.

The term

"satisfactory evidence" is not defined in the
statute.
2.

Section 27 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 821, is known as the savings or anti-preemption
clause.

The section provides that the Federal

Power Act is not to be construed as "affecting or
intending to affect or .. interfere" with state
laws on control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water.
a.

Identical or similar language preserving
state water law appears in other federal
regulatory and natural resources statutes,

6

including the Desert Land Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 321, and the Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 372, 383.
b.

Although the language of such clauses is
relatively similar, the clauses cannot be
read interchangeably; the reach of an anti
preemption clause is determined by the
context of the particular statute (compare
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop, v. Federal
Power Comm1n . 328 U.S. 152 (1946)

(Federal

Power Act) with California v. United States.
438 U.S. 645 (1978)

(Reclamation Act) and

California Oregon Power Co v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co.. 295 U.S. 142 (1935)

(Desert Land

Act); see also California v. FERC. ___ U.S. _
_1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)

(legislative

history, not just the language of the statute
is important for understanding the meaning of
similar language in varied statutes)).
3.

Section 9 prescribes the evidentiary burden which
an applicant bears in a FERC licensing proceeding
while section 27 addresses an applicant's
obligation to comply with state law, independent
of the federal licensing process.

B.

Section 27 was not intended to be a general provision
applicable to protect all state laws from federal
7

supremacy; it was not supposed to override more
specific provisions of the Federal Power Act.

Instead

of an absolute protection for state-granted rights,
arguably, section 27 only allows for compensation when
the grant of a federal license results in taking of
such rights (Portland General Electric Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n. 328 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964); see Grand
River Dam Auth. v. Grand-Hydro. 335 U.S. 359 (1948)).
1.

Section 27 must be seen as a protection against a
taking; a recognition that holders of vested state
water rights have proprietary interests worthy of
protection as property rights under the
Constitution.

2.

Section 27 merely complements the provision of the
Federal Power Act which permits federal licensees
to exercise powers of eminent domain (Federal
Power Act § 21, 16 U.S.C.§ 814).

3.

The purpose of section 27 in part was to clarify
that the mere passage of the Federal Power Act did
not act to abrogate state usufructuary rights
(Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp.. 347 U.S. 239 (1954)).

4.

Section 27 continued the well-established
congressional deference to state water law under
the equal footing doctrine.

C.

Section 9 was intended to guide FERC discretionary
8

authority where a state expressed a regulatory or
policy interest in a potential license.
1.

Compliance with state regulatory laws is not a
condition precedent to issuance of a FERC license.

2.

FERC, in its discretion, may reguire total or
partial compliance with state regulatory
requirements; nevertheless, FERC's obligation
always is to ensure that the purposes of the
Federal Power Act are achieved.

3.

The purpose of section 9 is largely informational:
FERC licensing decisions should be based upon
knowledge of state regulatory requirements so that
a decision to disregard or comply with state law
will be an informed one.

4.

FERC may disregard state law, if in its
discretion, such action is consistent with its
statutory mandate (see State of Oregon v. Idaho
Power Co.. 312 P.2d 583 (Or. 1957)

(state

licensing superfluous for a federal licensee);
Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Federal Power Comm1n .
308 F .2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert, denied. 372
U.S. 908 (1963); accord Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n. 453 F.2d 463
(2d Cir. 1971)

(FERC has discretion to determine

whether federal license will interfere with state
law), cert, denied. 407 U.S. 926 (1972)).
9

5.

FERC may not impose conditions on a hydropower
project license which would have the effect of
displacing state tort law; Congress did not intend
to authorize FERC to preempt such laws (South
Carolina Public Service Auth. v. FERC. 850 F.2d
788 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) .

D.

Read together, sections 9 and 27 of the Federal Power
Act demonstrate plenary federal control over regulation
of hydropower, with few caveats (see generally.
Comment, "Hydroelectric Power, the Federal Power Act
and State Water Laws: Is Federal Preemption Water Over
the Dam?" 17 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1179 (1984); Wolfe,
"Hydropower: FERC Licensing and Emerging State-Federal
Water Rights Conflicts," 29 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
851 (1983)).
1.

State proprietary rights survived passage of the
Federal Power Act and cannot be extinguished by
FERC order (Federal Power Comm1n v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954); Georgia Power
Co. v. Baker. 830 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1987)).

2.

If state proprietary rights are taken, adequate
compensation must be provided (Portland General
Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n. 328 F.2d 165
(9th Cir. 1964); Henry Ford & Son. Inc, v. Little
Falls Fibre Co.. 280 U.S. 369 (1930).

E.

Although not explicitly outlined in the statute, the
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Federal Power Act clearly contemplates a system of
dual, or concurrent government control, in which the
federal and state governments share control over
hydroelectric projects (First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop,
v. Federal Power Comm'n. 328 U.S. 152 (1945);
California v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May
21, 1990)).
1.

Concurrent federal and state control is not
unusual in federal environmental and natural
resources regulatory statutes.
a.

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401, 403 provides for joint jurisdiction
by the states and the Army Corps of
Engineers.

b.

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1344(a)
provides that a condition precedent for
issuance of a permit by the Army Corps of
Engineers is the obtaining of a state water
quality certification.

2.

Dual or concurrent authority is necessary to
resolve the apparent conflict between FERC's
obligations under section 10(a) to engage in
comprehensive planning and its obligation under
section 27 to respect state water laws.

F.

Congress recognized that, because of the subject and
scope of its jurisdiction, FERC frequently either would
ll

cooperate or conflict with state regulatory agencies.
Congress chose to require cooperation wherever possible
(see, e .q. . Federal Power Act § 7 (preference to states
and municipalities in issuance of licenses); § 10(j)
(consultation with states on fish and wildlife
protection); § 19 (provision of electricity subject to
state regulation)).
G.

Where cooperation was not desirable or practical,
specific provisions of the Federal Power Act explicitly
designate whether state or federal law will apply (see,
e .q ., Federal Power Act § 27 (states control
appropriation and use of water), § 10(a)

(federal

control over comprehensive planning for hydroelectric
development)).
III. HISTORICAL EFFORTS TO AVOID OR RESOLVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL LAW ON HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT
A.

First Iowa is the seminal case in the field.

In that

case, the Supreme Court held that concurrent
jurisdiction over hydropower resources by state and
federal government was unworkable.

(First Iowa Hydro-

Electric Coop, v. Federal Power Commission. 328 U.S.
152 (1946)).
1.

First Iowa established the law that, except where
proprietary rights are at issue, compliance with
state laws is required only when, and to the
extent that, the Federal Power Commission deems
compliance to be necessary.
12

Section 27 preserves only state proprietary rights
laws and not state regulatory laws.
First Iowa limited the reach of section 27 of the
Federal Power Act to the protection of stategranted proprietary rights, most important among
which is state water rights.
First Iowa did not define the limits, if any, on
state authority over water rights and the extent
to which a state could use its property law to
regulate a hydropower project.
a.

For example, the Court did not decide whether
a state can regulate a hydroelectric project
under the guise of protecting water rights;
such an exercise of state authority would be
consistent with the First Iowa protection of
state proprietary rights but would conflict
with the prohibition on state regulation of
federally-licensed hydroelectric projects.

b.

The Court did not draw a bright line between
state proprietary water rights and state
regulatory water rights, a distinction which
the Court has done nothing to clarify (see
California v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS
2614 (May 21, 1990)).

Unlike section 27 of the Federal Power Act, which
provides substantive protection to proprietary

rights, section 9 provides merely discretionary
authority to FERC; compliance with state laws
under section 9 is not a condition precedent to a
FERC license.
6.

Although the proceeding at issue in First Iowa
primarily concerned section 9, the Court has
rejected the argument that its discussion of
section 27 —

including the limitation of that

section to proprietary rights -- is mere dicta
(see generally Petitioner's Opening Brief,
California v. FERC. (U.S. Supreme Ct. No. 89-333)
(Jan. 11, 1990); California v. FERC, ___ U.S. __
1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).
B.

Since First Iowa, courts have consistently applied the
reasoning in that case to hold that states have had
limited -- or no —

role in regulating hydroelectric

development or operation of hydroelectric projects.
(See, e.q.. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma. 357
U.S. 320 (1958); Federal Power Comm1n v. Oregon, 349
U.S. 435 (1955); California ex rel. State Water
Resources Bd. v. FERC. 877 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1989);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm1n . 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 926 (1972); Washington Dep't of Game v. Federal
Power Comm1n . 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert,
denied. 347 U.S. 936 (1954); Town of Springfield v.
14

McCarren. 549 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Vt. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 942 (1983); Town of Springfield v.
Vermont Envtl. Bd.. 521 F. Supp. 243 (D. Vt. 1981)).
C.

It generally is accepted that the federal government
has occupied the entire field of hydroelectric power
regulation because of the pervasiveness of the federal
scheme (see Town of Springfield v. Vermont Envtl. Bd..
521 F. Supp. 243 (D. Vt. 1981); City of Tacoma v.
Taxpayers of Tacoma. 262 P.2d 214 (Wash. 1953)).

D.

Although interpreting the Reclamation Act rather than
the Federal Power Act, California v. United States has
been widely cited for the proposition that states
retain the power not only to grant but also to regulate
water rights notwithstanding federal regulatory
controls (California v. United States. 438 U.S. 645
(1978)) .
1.

At issue was section 8 of the Reclamation Act of
1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383, a provision whose
language is virtually identical to section 27 of
the Federal Power Act.

2.

The Court held that section 8 was designed to
protect more than only proprietary rights and was
broad enough to preclude preemption of any state
law governing water use or allocation.

3.

The Court held that a state may impose conditions
on a federal reclamation project so long as those
15

conditions are not inconsistent with federal
directives.
a.

The Court found that federal directives for
management of reclamation lands were not
inconsistent with deference to state water
laws.

b.

To preclude application of that holding to
its proceedings, FERC has taken the position
that the Court's requirement for consistency
with the federal scheme exempts it from
virtually all state water laws because of the
pervasive federal regulation of hydroelectric
facilities articulated in section 10 of the
Federal Power Act.

4.

The holding specifically applied to a state's
ability to regulate water rights.

The Court held

that the legislative history made it "abundantly
clear" that Congress intended "to defer to the
substance, as well as the form" of state water law
(California v. United States. 438 U.S. at 675).
5.

The only limitation on the Secretary of Interior's
obligation to comply with state law is that such
laws cannot be applied if to do so would conflict
with "clear congressional directives." (California
v. United States. 438 U.S. at 672)

6

.

The Supreme Court has rejected the assertion that
16

the case called into question, or even overruled,
sub silentio. the application of First Iowa to
section 27 of the Federal Power Act (California v.
FERC, ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).
a.

If the same interpretation were applied to
section 27 of the Federal Power Act as that
used by the Court in discussing section 8 of
the Reclamation Act, the reach of section 27
would be broadened substantially.

b.

The congressional directive favoring
comprehensive federal regulation and the
displacing of state laws is clearer in the
Federal Power Act.

c.

Application of the anti-preemption provisions
of the Reclamation Act would not frustrate
the very purpose of that statute since it is
not, at its heart, a regulatory statute.

The

contrary is true for the Federal Power Act.
E.

The courts have never adequately defined what state
rights fall within the protection of section 27; while
courts have been virtually unanimous in making the
distinction between property rights and governmental,
police, or regulatory powers, they rarely have been
called upon to make finer distinctions.
1.

The Ninth Circuit in California ex rel. State
Water Resources Bd. v. FERC somewhat incompletely
17

quoted the First Iowa decision as defining
proprietary rights as applying only to "municipal
and irrigation proprietary rights."
2.

State interest in protection of non-game wildlife
is probably not a proprietary interest, especially
in light of the strong federal interest (see
Missouri v. Holland. 252 U.S. 416 (1920)).

3.

Even protection of fisheries, which has a strong
proprietary component because of the importance of
fisheries to many states' economies, may not fall
within the protection of section 27 (California ex
rel. State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC, 877 F.2d
743 (9th Cir. 1989)).

4.

Although states have an interest in protection of
inchoate proprietary rights, courts have
consistently referred to the section 27 savings
clause as designed to protect only vested rights
(see Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Federal Power
Comm1n . 328 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964); there is no
indication that the section 27 protections are
designed to protect rights for which no
compensation would be available under the takings
clause of the United States Constitution (see
State of Oregon v. Idaho Power Co.. 312 P.2d 583
(Or. 1957)).

18

IV.

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND FERC ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE
PROBLEMS OF DUAL STATE-FEDERAL CONTROL
A.

The FERC, and before it the Federal Power Commission,
traditionally has viewed itself as being the final
arbiter of matters affecting the nation's hydroelectric
power resources.

B.

Consistent with that position, FERC has only
reluctantly complied with conflicting or competing
statutory and regulatory regimes, whether they concern
federal environmental statutes or state water rights
laws.
1.

For example, FERC did not promulgate regulations
implementing its environmental review procedures
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
until 1987, almost 20 years after the statute was
enacted (see 18 C.F.R. Part 380).

2.

Congress' enactment of the Electric Consumers
Protection Act was in large part brought about by
FERC's reluctance to give due consideration to
fish and wildlife and other non-power resources,
in the hydroelectric licensing process (see H.R.
Rep. No. 507, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.

3.

(1986)).

FERC has found that as a condition of its issuing
a hydroelectric license, it may limit a licensee's
ability to use its state-adjudicated water rights
(see, e.g.. Conway Ranch. 46 FERC H 62,332 (1989);
19

Howard & Mildred Carter. 40 FERC

C.

51

61,280

(1987)).

Relying on First Iowa. FERC consistently has rejected
assertions by state agencies, individual water users,
and project licensees that it should defer to state
water rights law in determining how a project should be
operated.

(see Henwood Assocs., Inc., 50 FERC 51 61,183

(1990); Twin Falls Canal Co.. 45 FERC 51 61,423 (1988)).
D.

In analysis which belies the clouded line between
section 9 and 27, FERC frequently has overruled state
attempts to exercise authority over water releases from
hydroelectric projects by holding that the Federal
Power Act creates an exclusively federal regulatory
scheme (see Guadaloupe-Blanco River Auth.. 42 FERC
51 61,079 (1988); Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 38
FERC 5[ 61,240, reh *q denied. 41 FERC 61,198 (1987);
Roseburq Resources. 41 FERC 51 61,142 (1987)).

E.

More recently, FERC appears to be resolving conflicts
with state water law by characterizing its decisions as
being the best comprehensive use of the waterway,
thereby cloaking its decisions with the protection of
section 9's requirement that state law can apply to the
extent that it is not inconsistent with the purpose of
the Federal Power Act (see Brazos River Auth.. 48 FERC
51 62,190 (1989); Twin Falls Canal Co. . 45 FERC f 61,423
(1988); accord California v. FERC. __ U.S. ___1990
LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).
20

1.

The use of the terminology "best comprehensive
use" is derived from section 10(a) of the Federal
Power Act which always has required FERC to
balance competing uses of navigable waters.

2.

The Electric Consumers Protection Act strengthened
the importance of section 10(a) by requiring that
FERC give "equal consideration" to power and non
power uses, thereby allowing FERC further
discretionary authority to find state laws not to
be consistent with the "best comprehensive use" of
a waterway.

3.

As a result of the revision to section 10(a) in
the Electric Consumers Protection Act, FERC's
authority was strengthened even more since it now
is required to take a more activist role; it can
no longer rely on state recommendations but must
itself determine the appropriate resource mix for
hydroelectric development (see, e .g .. Central
Nebraska Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist.. 50 FERC
61,180 (1990); Northern Lights. Inc.. 39 FERC
61,352 (1987)) .

F.

FERC perceives its authority to prescribe water release
regimes to be limited only by actions of other federal
agencies (see, e.g.. Henwood Assocs., Inc.. 50 FERC
f 61,183 (1990) (conflict with Bureau of Land
Management); Eugene Water and Elec. Bd.. 49 FERC
21

5 61,211 (1989)

(conflict with Army Corps of

Engineers).
V.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING FERC AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
WATER RIGHTS
A.

Recent developments have focused attention anew on the
long unresolved debate over the proper respective roles
of the states and federal governments in controlling
the hydroelectric power resource.
1.

Enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act and related statutes produced an
explosion in applications for new hydroelectric
project permits (see generally M.C. Whittaker,
"The Federal Power Act and Hydropower Development:
Rediscovering State Regulatory Powers and
Responsibilities," 10 Harv. Envtl. L.R. 135
(1986)).

2.

The expiration of the licenses on hundreds of
projects licensed for fifty-year terms in the
early days of the Federal Power Act has provided
an unusual opportunity to reexamine the
environmental desirability of these projects (see
52 Fed. Reg. 4648 (Feb. 13, 1987)

(list of

hydropower licenses expiring from 1987 through
2000)); FERC is facing license applications in
numbers not seen for fifty years.

Both the

hydroelectric industry and environmental
organizations are viewing this historical
22

phenomenon as an opportunity.
B.

Enactment of Electric Consumers Protection Act, Pub. L.
99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986).
1.

The Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986 was
the first significant revision to the
hydroelectric project licensing provisions of the
Federal Power Act since the 1920s (see generally
J.D. Echeverria, "The Electric Consumers
Protection Act of 1986," 8 Energy L.J. 61 (1987);
J.H. Bornong, "The Electric Consumer Protection
Act of 1986: Changes in Hydro Licensing?," 23
Gonzaga L.R. 135 (1987)).

2.

The importance of the new statute comes not only
from its provisions but from the time at which it
was enacted.

The environmental impacts of the

expiring licenses generally never had been
examined.

The renewal of licenses offered the

first opportunity to scrutinize the environmental
impacts of hydropower projects and to impose new
conditions to protect watershed ecology (see
generally J.H. Bornong, "The Electric Consumer
Protection Act of 1986: Changes in Hydro
Licensing?," 23 Gonzaga L.R. 135 (1987); J.D.
Echeverria et al.. Rivers At Risk (1989)).
3.

One of the major goals of the Electric Consumers
Protection Act was to ensure that FERC pays more
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attention to environmental concerns in deciding
whether to issue hydroelectric project licenses
(See generally J.D. Echeverria, "The Electric
Consumers Protection Act of 1986," 8 Energy L.J.
61 (1987)) .
4.

The statute adds both substantive and procedural
provisions elevating the importance of
environmental issues.
a.

New substantive provisions were added to
section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act
requiring FERC to "give equal consideration
to the purposes of energy conservation, the
protection, mitigation of damage to, and
enhancement of, fish and wildlife,

... the

protection of recreational opportunities, and
the preservation of other aspects of
environmental quality."

(Electric Consumers

Protection Act § 3(a), 16 U.S.C. § 797(e);
see also Electric Consumers Protection Act
§ 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1)

(adding

environmental protection issues to the
factors that FERC must consider in issuing
licenses)).

The purpose of these provisions

was to change FERC's public interest review
standards (see Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n.
387 U.S. 428 (1966)) to improve consideration
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of environmental factors (H.R. Rep. No. 934,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2496 (1986)

(conference

committee report on the statute)).
b.

New procedural requirements now require FERC
to solicit and consider the views of other
federal and state agencies on environmental
issues (Electric Consumers Protection Act
§ 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(2)(B)).

The

statute also establishes a complicated
consultation procedure requiring close
consultation between FERC and state and
federal fish and wildlife agencies (Electric
Consumers Protection Act § 10(j), 16 U.S.C.
§ 803(j)).

Notwithstanding the consultation

requirement, FERC has the discretion to
reject recommendations under certain
circumstances.
c.

FERC must adopt license conditions based upon
recommendations it receives from state and
federal fish and wildlife agencies.

If it

appears to FERC that the recommendations "may
be inconsistent with the purposes" of the
Federal Power Act or any other "applicable
law," FERC must resolve the inconsistency by
giving "due weight" to the recommendations
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and the "expertise, and statutory
responsibilities" of the recommending
agencies (Electric Consumers Protection Act
§ 10(j) , 16 U.S.C. § 803 (j)) .
d.

FERC's authority under the Electric Consumers
Protection Act to reject environmental
protection recommendations as being contrary
to law is consistent with FERC's authority
under section 9 of the Federal Power Act to
accept or reject state law reguirements.

e.

The statute disclaims any congressional
intent to "alter or establish the respective
rights of states, the United States ... or
any person with respect to any water or
water-related right." (Electric Consumers
Protection Act § 17, 100 Stat. 1259, 16
U.S.C. § 797 note)

5.

The statute directs FERC to apply new, and
greater, scrutiny to relicense applications to
ensure that each project meets today's more
sophisticated standards for whether resource
development is in the public interest (see H.R.
Rep. No. 507, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in
1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2496 (1986)).

6.

The new statute does not refer explicitly to, or
give guidance on how to resolve, disputes which
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might arise between FERC's new environmental
protection responsibilities and state proprietary
rights.

The legislative history of the Electric

Consumers Protection Act, on the contrary, focuses
only on recommendations which are "inconsistent
with the purposes and requirements" of the Federal
Power Act.

The conference report explains that

FERC's discretionary authority is intended to
ensure that environmental protection
recommendations do not give commenting agencies a
veto over FERC license decisions (H.R. Rep. No.
934, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
7.

(1986)).

The Electric Consumers Protection Act has no
provision for FERC to receive or consider comments
from state agencies responsible for protecting
proprietary rights.

The statute did not change or

clarify the interplay between sections 9 and 27 of
the Federal Power Act.
reaffirms —

Instead, the statute

and strengthens —

FERC's ultimate

authority to reconcile public interests affected
by hydroelectric development, including fish and
wildlife protection and recreation (see California
v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21,
1990)).
8.

Because the new statute was the first major
revision of the Federal Power Act since the
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Supreme Court's decision in First Iowa. Congress

had an opportunity —

which it declined —

to

explain or change how the dual authority of
federal and state laws is intended to operate.
a.

Congress' failure to address First Iowa and
the virtually unbroken line of cases striking
down most mandatory state regulations
affecting hydroelectric projects suggests
congressional satisfaction with the current
division of authority.

b.

Notwithstanding established law that FERC has
occupied the field of hydroelectric power
regulation, the Electric Consumers Protection
Act also makes FERC the regulator of
environmental and wildlife protection laws.
There is no indication in the plain language
of the statute that Congress intended for
FERC to occupy this field as well.

c.

The role of states as advisors in the FERC
licensing process is consistent with First
Iowa and its progeny which contemplate a
system of dual state and federal jurisdiction
in which FERC is the ultimate arbiter of
conflicts.

C.

The Electric Consumers Protection Act must be viewed in
the context of other congressional environmental
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protection and energy enactments of the 1970s and
1980s, all of which preserved federal control over
these issues.
1.

The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
encouraged the development of small hydroelectric
projects through financial and regulatory
incentives, but retained FERC control over the
licensing and regulation of these projects (Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. 95-617,
92 Stat. 3117 (1978)).

2.

The federal environmental protection laws,
including the National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361, the Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543, and the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287, enforce
procedural and substantive environmental
protections in which the states have only an
advisory role.

D.

The Ninth Circuit's decision in California ex rel.
State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC. 877 F.2d 743 (9th
Cir. 1989) offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to
clarify the interplay of sections 9 and 27 in cases
where there is no bright line between state water and
regulatory laws.
1.

The Ninth Circuit held that the California Water
Resources Control Board did not have the authority
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to set minimum water flow rates downstream which
were more stringent than FERC had set for the same
project as conditions of the FERC license because
the FERC license preempted state law.
2.

The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected California
v. United States. 438 U.S. 645, and its progeny,
construing language in the Reclamation Act of 1902
which is substantially similar to section 27, and
held that all aspects of state hydroelectric
regulation are preempted by federal law, except
for state proprietary rights.

The court

distinguished both the purpose and the nature of
the federal regulatory interest expressed in the
two statutes in holding that Reclamation Act
jurisprudence is not directly applicable to the
Federal Power Act.
3.

There is some dispute whether the California law
at issue was actually a proprietary rights law;
California does not recognize a proprietary right
in instream flows (see Brief of Respondent Rock
Creek Ltd. Ptshp., California v. FERC, (U.S.
Supreme Ct. No. 89-333)

E.

(Feb. 12, 1990)).

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth
Circuit in an opinion by Justice O'Connor (California
v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).
1.

The Court relied almost exclusively on the 1946
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decision in First Iowa

a.

Although the case would have presented a
"close question" if it were one of first
impression, the Court believed itself
constrained by First Iowa.

b.

Relying on the strength of stare decisis. the
Court adopted the principle that it is better
to be consistent than to be right in
statutory construction (see Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union. 491 U.S. ___ (1989)
(slip. op. at 4)).

Congress' passage of the Electric Consumers
Protection Act confirmed FERC's "broad and
paramount ... regulatory role" and affirmed
Congress' concurrence with the balance struck in
First Iowa and its progeny.
Allowing state regulatory control over minimum
instream flows would require the Court
"fundamentally to restructure" a "highly complex
and long-enduring regulatory regime."
The Court rejected the argument that the
discussion of section 27 in First Iowa was mere
dicta.
California v. United States does not control the
case and is not in tension with First Iowa, the
Court held.

a.

The language of the Reclamation Act and
Federal Power Act is similar but not
identical.

b.

The legislative history of the two statutes
is more important than the words used; the
histories are vastly different.

c.

The purpose of the Federal Power Act is to
provide an "active federal oversight role"
while the Reclamation Act contemplates that
the federal government will act like any
ordinary holder of a state water right.

6.

The California instream flow requirement is
preempted because it "would disturb" and "actually
conflicts" with, the "balance embodied" in the
FERC instream flow requirements.

7.

Although the Court's decision has reaffirmed the
validity of First Iowa, it did not resolve that
case's ambiguities.
a.

When is a right a proprietary right?

b.

When does a state regulatory scheme "actually
conflict with" or "disturb" FERC's obligation
to balance conflicting water needs?

c.

If a licensee can comply with both FERC and
state requirements (i.e . where the state
imposes different or more stringent
requirements than FERC), how does FERC
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determine whether a conflict or disturbance
exists?
F

FERC Decisions After the Ninth Circuit Decision in
California ex rel. State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC
1.

Since the Ninth Circuit's decision in California
ex rel. State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC, FERC
twice has cited that decision as providing further
support for its authority to control and impact
state water rights.
a.

The FERC has found that it possesses
authority to impair significantly the private
use of state water rights (see, e.g.. Brazos
River Auth.. 48 FERC

b.

62,190 (1989)).

The FERC also has held that it may overrule
state agency attempts to control the use of
such water rights (see, e.g., Henwood
Assocs.. Inc.. 50 FERC

2.

61,183 (1990)).

The FERC does not view the Ninth Circuit's
decision as providing new authority for its
actions, but only as providing additional support
for its long-standing view that First Iowa's
interpretation of section 27 of the Federal Power
Act enables the FERC in essence to preempt state
water law (see Henwood Assocs., Inc.. 50 FERC f
61,183 (1990); Brazos River Auth.. 48 FERC
62,190 (1989)).
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VI.

CONCLUSIONS

A.

Although the Supreme Court in California v. FERC
reaffirmed the validity of First Iowa after the
Electric Consumers Protection Act and California v.
United States, the Court did nothing to clarify the
interplay between sections 9 and 27.

B.

There appear to be three principal views on the role
which FERC plays in regulating water rights.
1.

One view is that FERC maintains regulatory
authority to disregard any state law except those
relating narrowly to the appropriation and use of
water (proprietary rights only).
a.

FERC can disregard state regulatory water
rights.

b.

Section 27 protects only vested water rights
recognized by state law.

c.

The Supreme Court appears to have adopted
this approach.

d.

Notwithstanding its doctrinal simplicity,
this view may be difficult to apply because
of the clouded line between proprietary
rights and regulatory laws which are attached
thereto.

2.

An alternative view is that section 27 protects
from preemption any state law which relates to
control or appropriation of water usage.
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a.

States retain right to regulate water rights.

b.

State regulatory water laws effectively can
veto a FERC license or can impose additional
conditions on the exercise of license rights
even if those conditions are inconsistent
with FERC license conditions.

c.

This broad reading of section 27 —

although

consistent with its plain language —
effectively has been killed by California v.
FERC.
3.

The best view appears to be that the states and
FERC exercise concurrent authority over all
hydroelectric regulatory matters, with disputes
between FERC and the states settled based upon
certain conflict resolution priorities.
a.

The Supreme Court says that it has adopted
this approach but is decisions suggest a
dissatisfaction with concurrent authority

b.

The Court is uneasy with any approach which
requires resolution of conflicts between
state and federal law.

C.

States retain preeminent authority in limited areas.
1.

State law is preeminent where vested rights are at
issue or an unconstitutional taking would occur.

2.

FERC must consult with the states over
environmental, wildlife, and fishery protection
35

issues under the Electric Consumers Protection

Act.
3.

If state law allows for iristream flow water rights
and such rights would be implicated by FERC
action, state law should be applied to determine
whether a taking would occur.

4.

States may impose additional regulatory burdens on
FERC licensees if to do so would not frustrate
either the purpose of the Federal Power Act or the
licensee's ability to operate its project.
a.

FERC has broad authority to define the
purpose of a project so as to preclude state
regulation.

b.

FERC's comprehensive planning obligation
leaves little room for state regulatory
requirements which might conceivably affect a
basin-wide development plan.

D.

FERC has comprehensive planning authority subject to
the states' limited authority.
1.

The Electric Consumers Protection Act clarifies
FERC's long-standing regulatory supremacy.

2.

FERC statutorily is charged with regulating
hydroelectric power in a coordinated, basin-wide
manner.

3.

FERC may not disregard any state regulatory laws
under section 9 unless compliance with both
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federal and state law would be a physical
impossibility or would impose a practical conflict
violative of the purpose of the Federal Power Act.
E.

FERC licensees must comply with the more stringent of
the requirements imposed by either the state or FERC
unless there is a practical conflict between those
requirements, in which case FERC becomes the final
arbiter of the dispute under section 9 of the Federal
Power Act.
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PRINCIPAL STATUTORY AND CASE REFERENCES

A.

FEDERAL POWER ACT PROVISIONS GRANTING FEDERAL CONTROL OVER
WATER RESOURCES IN CONTEXT OF HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT

1.

Section 4(e). 16 U.S.C. § 797(e)

The Commission is authorized and empowered
(e) To issue licenses to citizens of the United States, or
to any association of such citizens, or to any corporation
organized under the laws of the United States or any State
thereof, or to any State or municipality for the purpose of
constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits,
reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines, or other project
works necessary or convenient for the development and improvement
of navigation and for the development, transmission, and
utilization of power across, along, from or in any of the streams
or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction
under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States, or upon any part of the public lands
and reservations of the United States (including the
Territories), or for the purpose of utilizing the surplus water
or water power from any Government dam, except as herein
provided: Provided, That licenses shall be issued within any
reservation only after a finding by the Commission that the
license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose
for which such reservation was created or acquired, and shall be
subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of the
department under whose supervision such reservation falls shall
deem necessary for the adequate protection and utilization of
such reservation. Provided further. That no license affecting
the navigable capacity of any navigable waters of the United
States shall be issued until the plans of the dam or other
structures affecting navigation have been approved by the Chief
of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army. Whenever the
contemplated improvement is, in the judgment of the Commission,
desirable and justified in the public interest for the purpose of
improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or
benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, a finding to that
effect shall be made by the Commission and shall become a part of
the records of the Commission: Provided further. That in case
the Commission shall find that any Government dam may be
advantageously used by the United States for public purposes in
addition to navigation, no license therefor shall be issued until
two years after it shall have reported to Congress the facts and
conditions relating thereto, except that this provision shall not
apply to any Government dam constructed prior to June 10, 1920:
And provided further. That upon the filing of any application for
a license which has not been preceded by a preliminary permit
under subsection (f) of this section, notice shall be given and
published as required by the proviso of said subsection.
In
deciding whether to issue any license under this Part for any
project, the Commission, in addition to the power and development

purposes for which licenses are issued, shall give equal
consideration to the purposes of energy conservation, the
protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), the
protection of recreational opportunities, and the preservation of
other aspects of environmental quality.
2.

Section 6, 16 U.S.C. § 799

Licenses under this Part shall be issued for a period not
exceeding fifty years. Each such license shall be conditioned
upon acceptance by the licensee of all the terms and conditions
of this Act and such further conditions, if any, as the
Commission shall prescribe in conformity with this Act, which
said terms and conditions and the acceptance thereof shall be
expressed in said license. Licenses may be revoked only for the
reasons and in the manner prescribed under the provisions of this
Act, and may be altered or surrendered only upon mutual agreement
between the licensee and the Commission after thirty days' public
notice. Copies of all licenses issued under the provisions of
this Part and calling for the payment of annual charges shall be
deposited with the General Accounting Office, in compliance with
section 3743, Revised Statutes, as amended (U.S.C., title 41,
sec. 20).
3.

Section 7(a). 16 U.S.C. 5 800(a)

(a) In issuing preliminary permits hereunder or original
licenses where no preliminary permit has been issued, the
Commission shall give preference to applications therefor by
States and municipalities, provided the plans for the same are
deemed by the Commission equally well adapted, or shall within a
reasonable time to be fixed by the Commission be made equally
well adapted, to conserve and utilize in the public interest the
water resources of the region; and as between other applicants,
the Commission may give preference to the applicant the plans of
which it finds and determines are best adapted to develop,
conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water resources
of the region, if it be satisfied as to the ability of the
applicant to carry out such plans.
4.

Section 9(a). 16 U.S.C. 5 802(a)

(a) Each applicant for a license under this chapter shall
submit to the commission -(1) Such maps, plans, specifications, and estimates of cost
as may be required for a full understanding of the proposed
project. Such maps, plans, and specifications when approved by
the Commission shall be made a part of the license; and
thereafter no change shall be made in said maps, plans, or
specifications until such changes shall have been approved and
made a part of such license by the Commission.
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(2) Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied
with the requirements of the laws of the State or States within
which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed
and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water
for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the
business of developing, transmitting, and distributing power, and
in any other business necessary to effect the purposes of a
license under this Act.
5.

Section 10(a), 16 U.S.C. 5 803 (aHl)

All licenses issued under this Part shall be on the
following conditions:
(a)(1) That the project adopted, including the maps, plans,
and specifications, shall be such as in the judgment of the
Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for
improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or
benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement
and utilization of water power development, for the adequate
protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife
(including related spawning grounds and habitat), and for other
beneficial public uses, including irrigation, flood water, water
supply, and recreational and other purposes referred to in
section 4(e) if necessary in order to secure such plan the
Commission shall have authority to require the modification of
any project and of the plans and specification of the project
works before approval.
6.

Section 10(i). 16 U.S.C. $ 803(i)

All licenses issued under this Part shall be on the
following conditions:
(j)(l) That in order to adequately and equitably protect,
mitigate damages to, and enhance, fish and wildlife (including
related spawning grounds and habitat) affected by the
development, operation, and management of the project, each
license issued under this Part shall include conditions for such
protection, mitigation, and enhancement. Subject to paragraph
(2), such conditions shall be based on recommendations received
pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. 661
et seq.) from the National Marine Fisheries Service, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, and State fish and wildlife
agencies.
(2) Whenever the Commission believes that any
recommendation referred to in paragraph (1) may be inconsistent
with the purposes and requirements of this Part or other
applicable law, the Commission and the agencies referred to in
paragraph (1) shall attempt to resolve any such inconsistency,
giving due weight to the recommendations, expertise, and
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statutory responsibilities of such agencies.
If, after such
attempt, the Commission does not adopt in whole or in part a
recommendation of any such agency, the Commission shall publish
each of the following findings (together with a statement of the
basis for each of the findings):
(A) A finding that adoption of such recommendation is
inconsistent with the purposes and requirements of this Part or
with other applicable provisions of law.
(B) A finding that the conditions selected by the
Commission comply with the requirements of paragraph (1).
Subsection (i) shall not apply to the conditions required under
this subsection.
7.

Section 21. 16 U.S.C. 5 814

When any licensee can not acquire by contract or pledges an
unimproved dam site or the right to use or damage the lands or
property of others necessary to the construction, maintenance, or
operation of any dam, reservoir, diversion structure, or the
works appurtenant or accessory thereto, in conjunction with an
improvement which in the judgment of the Commission is desirable
and justified in the public interest for the purpose of improving
or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of
interstate or foreign commerce, it may acquire the same by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of
the United States for the district in which such land or other
property may be located, or in the State courts. The practice
and procedure in any action or proceedings for that purpose in
the district court of the United States shall conform as nearly
as may be with the practice and procedure in similar action or
proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is
situated: Provided. That United States district courts shall
only have jurisdiction of cases when the amount claimed by the
owner of the property to be condemned exceeds $3,000.
8.

Section 27. 16 U.S.C. § 821

Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or
intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of
the respective States relating to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal
or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.
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B.

PRINCIPAL AND RECENT COURT CASES

1.

California v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21,
1990)
[See discussion of Ninth Circuit opinion below]

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit
opinion, holding that the principle of stare decisis demanded
adherence to First Iowa Hvdro-Electric Power Coop, v. Federal
Power Comm1n . although were the issue one of first impression, it
would present a "close guestion." While the decision was based
almost entirely on First Iowa, the Court did hold that Congress'
enactment of the Electgric Consumers Protection Act reaffirmed
FERC's broad and paramount control over hydroelectric power
resources. The Court also rejected the parallel between language
in section 27 of the Federal Power Act and substantially similar
language in section 8 of the Reclamation Act.
2.

First Iowa Hvdro-Electric Coop, v. Federal Power Comm'n. 328
U.S. 152, 66 S.Ct. 906 (1946).

The petitioner applied to the Federal Power Commission for a
license to operate a hydroelectric project without attempting to
comply with an Iowa law which forbids dam construction without a
state permit. The Commission granted the license nonetheless,
citing its authority under section 9 of the Federal Power Act.
Because the state law purported to impose a permit requirement
which supplemented the federal permit requirement, the Court held
that the applicant was not required to comply with Iowa law as a
condition precedent to a federal license. The Court
distinguished between sections 9 and 27 of the Federal Power Act.
Section 27, which protects state law from supersedure by the
Federal Power Act, is limited to those laws which relate to the
protection of property rights in water. Section 9 has broader
reach, and applies in all circumstances in which property rights
are not at issue. Section 9 does not require compliance with
state law but only empowers the Federal Power Commission to
require such evidence of compliance with state law as, in the
Commission's judgment, would be "appropriate to effect the
purposes of the federal license on the navigable waters of the
United States."
The Court explained that the Federal Power Act establishes a
dual system of control between the state and federal government
in which there is a "division of the common enterprise between
two cooperating agencies of government, each with final authority
in its own jurisdiction. The duality does not require two
agencies to share in the final decision of the same issue. Where
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the Federal Government supercedes the state government there is
no suggestion that the two agencies both shall have final
authority." States retain regulatory control only over
allocation of proprietary rights. Regulatory matters are within
the exclusive purview of the federal government, the Court
concluded; within the regulatory arena, an applicant need not
comply with any state laws if such laws could conceivably
conflict with the federal scheme.
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the Federal
Power Act in noting that state authority was severely limited.
Even as to control of water rights, the states retained authority
only because of the explicit provision to such effect in the
Federal Power Act. Citing United States v. Appalachian Power
Co.. 311 U.S. 377 (1940), the Court noted that state control over
waters within their borders is "subject to the acknowledged
jurisdiction of the United States under the Constitution in
regard to commerce and the navigation of the waters and rivers."
3.

Federal Power Comm1n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. , 347 U.S.
239, 74 S.Ct. 487 (1954).

A challenge was brought to an order of the Federal Power
Commission which disallowed, as amortization reserve, the
expenses which Niagara Falls Power Company had to pay for the use
of private water rights needed as part of its power project. The
Commission had disallowed the expenses because it considered
those rights no longer to exist. The Court of Appeals' reversal
of that decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. At issue was
whether the Federal Power Act abolished water rights which
interfered with the operation of federally-licensed projects.
The Court explained that, although water rights are usufructuary
rights, the Federal Power Act treats those rights no differently
from other property rights. While the Act allows for federal
purchase or condemnation of such rights, the Act does not have
the effect of seizing, abolishing, or eliminating water rights
without compensation, the Court held. Preexisting water rights
are to survive unless purchased.
4.

Washington Dep't of Game v. Federal Power Comm1n . 207 F.2d
391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert, denied. 347 U.S. 936 (1954).

The state petitioned for review of a Federal Power
Commission order granting a license to a municipality to operate
a dam. The state had opposed the license on the grounds that the
municipality had not sought or received permits from the
Department of Fisheries and Game for the dam construction. Under
First Iowa, the court held that the Commission was acting within
its discretionary authority when it failed to require the
municipality to demonstrate its compliance with the laws of
Washington state. Notwithstanding the state's claim that the
federal dam would have disastrous impacts on the state fisheries,
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the court noted that if the project "will destroy the fish
industry of the river, we are powerless to prevent it."
5.

California v. Federal Power Comm'n. 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied. 382 U.S. 941 (1965).

Both the state and the licensees challenged a Federal Power
Commission order which imposed conditions on operation of a
hydroelectric project for the protection of downstream fisheries.
The Federal Power Commission order mandated specified instream
flows to maintain salmon runs in the river. The licensee
claimed, and the Federal Power Commission did not dispute, that
the conditions impaired their ability to deliver irrigation water
pursuant to state water rights. The court held that the Federal
Power Commission had the authority under section 27 of the
Federal Power Act to impose a license condition "which would
operate to impair the districts' full use of their irrigation
water rights in some future year." The holding was based, in
part, upon the court's conclusion that the licensee was protected
by a reopener clause in the license which provided for
application to the Commission for changes in the license
conditions for emergency situations. The court explicitly
concluded that the Federal Power Commission "has the legal
authority to take appropriate action restricting the use of such
irrigation rights, should the occasion arise."
6.

Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm'n . 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
926 (1972).

The City of New York intervened in a long-disputed Federal
Power Commission proceeding over a pumped-storage hydroelectric
project on the Hudson River in New York. Numerous challenges
were raised to the Federal Power Commission order granting the
license. The City of New York argued that the license violated
section 27 of the Federal Power Act because the project posed a
potential danger to, and therefore interfered with, a New Yorkowned aqueduct. The court held that, pursuant to section 9, the
Federal Power Commission had adequately considered the
interference issue before granting the license. New York should
not be permitted to exercise a veto over the license merely
because it disagreed with the Federal Power Commission
conclusion, the court held, quoting from First Iowa.
7.

Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. FERC. 868 F.2d 592
(3d Cir. 1989).

The state brought suit challenging FERC's refusal to reopen
a licensing proceeding to consider the state's input into the
environmental review process. The state argued that the FERC
license interfered with state property and Pennsylvania law
regulating lands and water. The court rejected the state's
7

argument and held that, under First Iowa, a state retains only
very limited authority. Quoting First Iowa, the court explained
that the Federal Power Act does not "permit interference with
certain state laws relating 'to the control, appropriation, use
or distribution of water in irrigation or for municipal or other
uses of the same nature.'" States do not retain control over
matters such as pollution, flood control, aesthetics, recreation,
and natural resources conservation, the court held.
8.

State of California ex rel. State Water Resources Bd. v.
FERC, 877 F .2d 743 (9th Cir. 1989), cert, granted. 110 S.Ct.
537 (1989), aff'd. __ U.S. ___, 1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21,
1990)

California sought review of a FERC order which set water
flow rates for a FERC-1icensed hydroelectric project. California
alleged that the State Water Resources Control Board had the
authority to set terms and conditions on water flow pursuant to
state law, notwithstanding a FERC order which set a minimum flow
rate. California argued that the licensee had to comply not with
the FERC-imposed instream flow conditions but also with the more
stringent minimum flow conditions which it had set. So long as
the licensee complied with state law, it claimed, the licensee
automatically would comply with FERC-imposed conditions.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Power Act preempted
state law and that FERC, therefore, had exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the instream flow that the project operator had to
preserve in Rock Creek. At issue was whether the FERC's
imposition of minimum flow releases for fishery protection and
other purposes was an integral part of FERC's comprehensive
planning and licensing authority under section 10(a) of the
Federal Power Act. The court contrasted section 27 of the
Federal Power Act, which provides that the Act is not intended
"to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of the
respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water..." with section 4(e), section 10(a), and
section 7(a). The Ninth Circuit held that the "weight of the
comprehensive planning authority and the individual powers
assigned to support that authority falls quite heavily on the
side of federal exclusivity."
The Court rejected California v. United States. 438 U.S. 645
(1978) in favor of First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop, v. FPC. 328
U.S. 152 (1946). The court held that the Federal Power Act, read
as a whole, teaches that "Congress intended federal law to
preempt state regulation in all aspects of hydropower projects
save for the limited proprietary exceptions specified" in section
27.
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9.

Town of Springfield v. Vermont Envtl. Bd.. 521 F. Supp. 243
(D. Vt. 1981).

Town brought action challenging a state order which
prohibited the town from proceeding with a hydroelectric project
until it obtained a state land use permit. The district court
held that the state order was void because the state's
withholding of a state permit had the effect of thwarting a
project the permit for which was regulated by FERC. The Court
rejected the state's argument that it was entitled at least to
regulate "corollary improvements" relating to highways and
recreational areas which were not used in connection with the
generation of hydroelectric power. The Court held that the
reservation of authority to the states in section 27 of the
Federal Power Act was limited to those specific areas enumerated
in the statute and, as to other matters, exclusive regulatory
jurisdiction lay with FERC. The Federal Power Act prohibits a
state from requiring a permit for any matter related to a FERClicensed project if such a permit is a condition precedent to
obtaining a federal license. In explaining the pervasiveness of
FERC regulation of hydro projects, the court stated that there is
a "clear Congressional intent to bring all aspects of [a]
hydroelectric project within the purview of the federal
regulatory scheme."
10.

Mega Renewables v. County of Shasta. 644 F. Supp. 491 (E.D.
Cal. 1986).

Plaintiffs alleged that a local ordinance and section 1603
of the California Fish and Game Code both were preempted by the
Federal Power Act to the extent that the state law affected
federal hydropower projects. On motion for summary judgment, the
court held that the state law was not preempted but the local
ordinance was. The state law was valid, the court concluded,
because it required only the submission of information to the
state and did not purport to impose a permit requirement which
could have the effect of vetoing a federal project. The court
explained that First Iowa prohibited only those state laws which
otherwise would allow a state veto of a federal project. Noting
that courts are reluctant to infer preemption of an entire field,
the court explicitly rejected the argument that the Federal Power
Act preempts the entire field of water power projects. Unlike
the state law, the local ordinance imposed a permit requirement
on all hydro projects. Reading First Iowa to prohibit any nonfederal permitting requirement, the court struck down the local
permit ordinance.
11.

City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma. 262 P.2d 214, 43
Wash. 2d 468 (1953).

The City of Tacoma brought a declaratory judgment action
seeking determination of whether it had to comply with Washington
9

state fishery protection laws in order to operate a federally
licensed dam within the state. The court noted that compliance
with Washington fishery laws would force abandonment of the
project and that by enforcing those laws, therefore, the state
effectively could veto the federal hydropower license. Because
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution prohibited
a state veto over a federal action, the court held that where
state and federal statutes cannot be reconciled, "the action of a
state even under its police power must give way." The court
further held that the Federal Power Act had preempted the entire
field of regulation of dams on navigable waters.
12.

Oregon v. Idaho Power Co.. 312 P.2d 583, 211 Or. 284 (1957).

Idaho Power Company was indicted for constructing a
hydroelectric project without a license from the Oregon
Hydroelectric Commission. Although conceding that the project
was constructed over navigable waters, Oregon claimed that the
"use and appropriation of water rights ... is within the control
and authority vested in the state of Oregon and not within the
authority of the licensing power of the Federal Power
Commission." Quoting from First Iowa, the court disagreed,
holding that the section 27 savings clause of the Federal Power
Act only protects state proprietary rights, not state regulatory
powers. Under section 27, the state is entitled only to
compensation under the takings clause of the United States
Constitution.
C.

PRINCIPAL RECENT FERC CASES

1.

Henwood Assocs. , Inc.

50 FERC

61,183 (Feb. 15, 1990).

In an original license proceeding, the FERC determined that
recommendations of the California Department of Fish and Game
regarding minimum flows would render the project uneconomic if
implemented. FERC therefore rejected the agency's proposed
minimum flows and implemented those recommended by its staff.
The FERC also found that minimum flows required by the
California Water Resources Control Board as a condition of a
Clean Water Act section 401 water quality certificate were not
enforceable against the proposed project because the FERC found
the Water Resources Board to have waived the section 401
certification requirement for the project. In discussing the
Water Resources Board's actions, the FERC cited California ex
rel. State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC. 877 F.2d 743 (9th Cir.
1989) in rejecting the Board's assertion that it had authority
under state law to establish minimum flows. The FERC noted,
however, that State of California did not "address the issue of
whether the Water Resources Board is authorized under the Clean
Water Act to establish minimum flows by adoption of minimum flow
conditions in a state water rights permit."
(This issue needs to
10

be addressed, although the FERC is unlikely to be the one to
decide the point, because the FERC has consistently held that
"review of the appropriateness of a section 401(a)(1)
certification condition is a matter for the state courts, not a
federal agency or court.")
In Henwood. the FERC also found that the Bureau of Land
Management has authority under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (FLPMA), to require
project licensees to obtain FLPMA right-of-way permits.
In this
proceeding, the BLM had issued a permit containing a condition
that the project release certain minimum flows — flows identical
to those recommended by California Fish & Game and rejected by
the FERC as rendering the project uneconomic. The FERC noted its
belief that a FLPMA right-of-way permit is not necessarily a
prerequisite to issuance of a license nor is it a condition of
such license, unless the permit is issued to protect a federal
"reservation," in which case the FERC must include the permit's
conditions in a project's license pursuant to section 4(e) of the
Federal Power Act. The FERC indicated its discomfort with its
finding that hydro projects must obtain FLPMA permits by stating
"[i]t appears to us that the denial or conditioning of a rightof-way under FLPMA should not be allowed to be a de facto veto of
the Commission's license. Indeed, it may well be that BLM has
exceeded its authority under FLPMA in imposing such conditions in
the grant of the right-of-way. However, we recognize that this
is a matter for the courts to decide."
2.

Central Nebraska Pub. Power and Irrigation Dist.. 50 FERC ?
61,180 (Feb. 14, 1990).

In this order, the FERC responded to the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals' decision in Platte River Whooping Crane Critical
Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC. 876 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
in which the court had reversed the FERC's prior refusal to
impose interim measures to protect whooping crane habitat (and
that of several other endangered or threatened species) pending
the completion of relicensing proceedings for two Nebraska hydro
projects. The Commission found that the potential for
significant, irreversible injury to the whooping crane's habitat
in central Nebraska justified the imposition of interim measures
requiring, among other things, maintenance of certain instream
flows downstream of the two projects.
The FERC found, however, that it possessed authority to
impose interim conditions only on one of the projects, the
downstream project of the two. Due to the small amount of
storage in the downstream project's facilities, however, the FERC
had to tie the magnitude of the required flows to the volume of
water stored in the upstream project's reservoir.
(Although it
lacked authority to impose unilateral conditions on the upstream
project's license, the FERC implored the upstream project
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operator to assist in facilitating the required flows). When the
volume of storage in the upstream reservoir equalled 1.3 million
acre-feet or more, minimum instream flows (in an approximately
118 mile stretch of the Platte River) would be required which
would vary depending on the endangered resources' seasonal
requirements. When the volume of storage was between 900,000
acre-feet and 1.3 million acre-feet, a constant minimum flow of
400 cubic feet per second would be required. No minimum flows
would be imposed when storage was less than 900,000 acre-feet.
3.

Eugene Water and Elec. Bd., 49 FERC J 61,211 (Nov. 16,
1989) .

FERC in this case found that it possessed no authority to
impose minimum flows on a new project located at an existing U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers dam, because the Corps had sole control
over the dam's release schedule. The Corps would release water
from the dam as necessary to satisfy the authorized purposes of
the dam (flood control, recreation and conservation); power would
be generated only when such releases so allowed.
4.

Brazos River Auth.. 48 FERC ^ 62,190 (Sept. 14, 1989).

In this case, the FERC's Director of Hydropower Licensing
addressed a conflict among water supply obligations of a
licensee, recreational use of a dam's reservoir and minimum
releases from the dam necessary to protect downstream fishery
resources. The case involved the new license application of a
project operator whose 50-year federal license for the Morris
Sheppard Dam was expiring. At its maximum storage level, the dam
impounded approximately 570,200 acre-feet of water contained in a
reservoir with a surface area of 17,600 acres. The dam was
operated in a "peaking" mode, with water released from the dam
only when power generation was needed to meet electric system
power demands or when releases were required to meet downstream
water supply requirements.
As a preliminary matter, the Director of Hydropower
Licensing found that the FERC had exclusive authority to control
flow regimes at the dam, citing to California ex rel. State Water
Resources Bd. v. FERC. "[S]tates must yield to the Commission
when a state's and the Commission's respective authorities over
state waters are in conflict." Given the FERC's preeminent
authority, the Director went on to discuss how the FERC staff
resolved conflicts among the various uses of the Morris Sheppard
Dam and its reservoir.
The Director found that consistent with sections 4(e) and
10(a) of the Federal Power Act, the FERC was required "to
consider and balance, in the public interest, all uses of the
waterway on which a project is proposed to be located." The FERC
staff therefore developed a minimum flow regime that included a
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drought contingency plan that would reduce the required minimum
flows in times of drought in order to mitigate the impact on the
licensee's water supply obligations and on recreational use of
the reservoir. Nevertheless, the staff did not go as far as the
licensee desired, instead deciding that minimum flows had to be
maintained, at least in part, in times of drought in order to
protect downstream aquatic resources. The Director's order in
this case therefore represents an attempt to strike a balance
between the competing needs of aquatic resources on the one hand,
and water supply and reservoir recreation on the other.
5.

Meaa Renewables 47 FERC f 61,194 (May 4, 1989).

In Mega Renewables, certain landowners contested the FERC's
issuance of an exemption from licensing for a small hydro
project. The landowners alleged that operation of the project
would adversely affect existing water rights holders by changing
the prevailing regime of water releases, diversion and uses. The
FERC rejected these allegations by referring to an agreement
between the hydro developer and the water users' association (of
which the contesting landowners were members) wherein the
developer agreed that its rights to water for power generation
purposes were subordinate to the water users'. The FERC found
that this agreement assured that the proposed hydro project would
not interfere with the landowners' water rights.
6.

Conway Ranch. 46 FERC J 62,332 (March 31, 1989)

The FERC's Director of Hydropower Licensing rejected in
Conwav Ranch a license applicant's argument that state
adjudicated water rights cannot be abrogated by FERC. The FERC
required as a condition of its issuance of a license for the
applicant's proposed hydro project that the project release
minimum flows varying from 1.5 to 4.0 cubic feet per second,
depending upon the amount of inflow to the project's facilities.
The FERC also imposed a condition on the license requiring the
project to release flushing flows in June of each year. The FERC
justified its action by reasoning that "the fact that the
applicant is free to use [its adjudicated allotment of] 6 cfs for
irrigation purposes does not mean that it is similarly free to
use the water for hydroelectric generation without restriction.
It is well established that the Commission may include a
condition in a license which would impair the licensee's full use
of its water rights."
(Citing California v. Federal Power
Comm'n . 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965).
More than a year later, the applicant refused the FERC
license for the project in order to protect its 128-year
irrigation water right. See Hvdro-Wire vol. 11, no. 10 at 5 (May
21, 1990).
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7.

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 46 FERC 5 61,249 (Feb. 27, 1989).

In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.. a hydro license article
reserving to the FERC authority to require modification of
project operations for the protection and development of fish and
wildlife resources was read to include authority to require
changes in minimum flows in the future. The licensee had argued
that the FERC authority to require changes in project operation
was limited to instances "where some major, unexpected change in
circumstances arose."
In response, the Commission rebutted the licensee's
arguments with references to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
California v. Federal Power Comm'n. 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965)
("When the Commission reasonably foresees the possibility that a
need may develop years in the future requiring, in the public
interest, the imposition of a burden upon the licensee at that
time, but either the dimensions of the need or the way of meeting
it is not presently ascertainable, the license terms cannot
possibly speak with definiteness and precision concerning the
matter. Under these circumstances, it is sufficient, under
section 6 [of the FPA], to include in the license a condition
reserving the problem, including the licensee's rights to test
the validity of any future action taken."), South Carolina Elec.
& Gas Co.. 30 FPC 1338 (1963) ("The Commission in recent months
had undertaken a review of hydroelectric licenses in the interest
of making the most effective use of its authority to impose
conditions upon licensee[s] in the public interest.... This
review has increased our awareness of the potential contribution
of the license conditions to comprehensive resource
development."), and Trinity River Auth. of Texas. 41 FERC 5
61,300 (1987). The FERC summarized its views by stating that its
"obligation under Section 10(a) [of the FPA] is a continuing one
throughout the term of the license. When information becomes
available to us, through our staff, another agency, the licensee,
or the public in general, that a project may no longer conform to
the comprehensive development standard, we may investigate that
situation and then require changes to project operation or
facilities as our authority permits."
8.

Twin Falls Canal Co.. 45 FERC

62,534 (Dec. 15, 1988)

In this proceeding, the FERC required, as part of mitigating
the cumulative impacts on fish and wildlife of the project under
consideration and three other Snake River Basin projects, that
the project licensee participate in a "comprehensive water
block," which would provide for varying water releases from each
project, depending upon resource needs. The Commission also
required that the licensee purchase and/or lease water from the
State of Idaho's "Water Bank" if necessary to satisfy the
required minimum flow releases.
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FERC reviewed the proposed conditions to the project license
under its duty to ensure that the project is consistent with the
best comprehensive use of the waterway. In developing the
required minimum flow regime, FERC therefore rejected an agency's
proposed flow regime as having too great an impact on irrigation
and power generation. The flow regime rejected by the Commission
would have required releases of 300 cfs in the irrigation season
and 1260 cfs in the non-irrigation season. Instead, the
Commission adopted a minimum flow regime requiring year-round
releases of 200 cfs for fish and wildlife purposes. The FERC
also approved special 10,000 cfs releases on eight days in May
and June of each year when such flows would be available for
Whitewater boaters.
The Commission authorized the licensee to release flows less
than the required minimums when sufficient water was unavailable
from the state "Water Bank" or from water surplus to irrigation
needs. The Commission expressly rejected, however, the State of
Idaho's request that the FERC include in the project license a
condition subordinating the use of water for hydropower
generation to use of water for upstream depletions, including
irrigation.
"[T]he subordination clause ... could nullify the
balance struck by us under the comprehensive planning provisions
of Section 10(a)(1) of the FPA in issuing the license.
Consequently, inclusion of the open-ended water subordination
clause in the license as requested by [the state] would interfere
with the exercise of our comprehensive planning responsibilities
under Section 10(a)(1) of the FPA and thus would be inconsistent
with the scheme of regulation established by the FPA, which vests
in the Commission the exclusive authority to determine whether,
and under what conditions, a license should issue."
(Citing to
First Iowa). The Commission acknowledged that the State of Idaho
was not precluded from petitioning the FERC in the future for a
determination that hydropower generation at the project should be
reduced to accommodate upstream water uses.
9.

Guadaloupe-Blanco River Auth.. 42 FERC f 61,079 (Jan. 28,
1988) .

FERC's decision in this case was significant in that it was
the first proceeding involving post-ECPA environmental review in
which the Commission asserted its authority to impose minimum
flows for fishery protection in opposition to a state's
assertions of exclusive jurisdiction over water rights.
(The
Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership cases, and the Ninth Circuit's
affirmance of the FERC's decisions in those cases — California
ex rel. State Water Resources Bd.. involved pre-ECPA
environmental review by the FERC).
The Commission found that "to the extent Texas water right
laws would require a release regime for the project that
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conflicts with the minimum flow requirements contained in the
license, those laws are inconsistent with the scheme of the FPA
and are superseded by it. ... [Wjhile Section 27 protects
"proprietary" rights in water acquired from a state, it does not
abrogate the Commission's authority to require a licensee to
release water from its licensed project for fishery protection
and other purposes. ... [Section 27] only establishes a right of
compensation for vested water rights taken by a Commission
licensee."
10.

Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership. 38 FERC
61,240 (March 11,
1987), reh'q denied. 41 FERC J 61,198 (Nov. 20, 1987),
affirmed in California ex rel. State Water Resources Bd. v.
FERC. 877 F .2d 743 (9th Cir. 1989), cert, granted. 110 S.Ct.
537 (1989), aff'd. ___ U.S. ___, 1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21,
1990) .

In its two orders, the Commission found the Supreme Court's
decision in First Iowa to be controlling precedent concerning the
authority of states to impose minimum flow releases from FERClicensed hydro projects. The FERC therefore found that the
California Water Resources Control Board was preempted from
imposing minimum flow requirements.
"[T]he authority to impose
minimum flow releases resides exclusively with [the Commission],
since it is an integral part of our responsibilities under
Section 10(a)."
11.

Roseburg Resources. 41 FERC 5 61,142 (Nov. 6, 1987).

In this case the FERC cited both First Iowa and the first
Rock Creek order as support for rejecting the minimum flows
recommended by a California state agency to be released from a
new project.
"[T]he establishment of minimum flows is a matter
beyond the reach of state regulation."
12.

Howard & Mildred Carter. 40 FERC ^ 61,280 (Sept. 18, 1987).

In Carter. the FERC rejected the license applicants' claim
that they had the right to dewater the stream on which the
proposed hydro project would be located. The Commission stated
that "[a] licensee must accept the reasonable restrictions and
obligations that the Commission attaches to" a hydropower
license.
"The Commission has clear authority to require a 4 cfs
minimum flow release at the project, even if such requirement
impairs the licensee's irrigation water rights."
13.

City of Santa Clara. 20 FERC H 61,257 (Aug. 31, 1982), reh'q
denied. 22 FERC f 61,121 (Feb. 4, 1983).

In these two orders, the FERC considered complaints by a
water users association that operation of the proposed project
would require utilization of water rights not possessed by the
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project licensee. The Commission found that if the licensee was
unsuccessful in obtaining the requisite water rights under state
law, then the licensee could obtain these property interests
under Section 21 of the FPA.
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